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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
assigned? Or does the Court, more likely, mean something less than
this? A strict duty would require the Court to examine the charge as
appellant's counsel, and sift out his better points. It seems questionable,
at least, that the Court intends to saddle itself with such a duty, but
more likely that it intends to act at its discretion in such a matter.
Even if the latter of these is the proper meaning to be attached to
the principal case the solicitor is burdened with a duty heretofore un-
realized-namely, to see that the evidence stated in the case on appeal
supports the summation of the evidence by the trial judge with respect
to all material facts in any case in which any error in the charge is
urged.23 The Court will not go beyond the record on appeal 24 and a
situation in which the charge is not so supported falls within even a
narrow interpretation of the principal case.
This seems of little practical significance to trial attorneys who would
not conceivably rely on such in the handling of a case, and it seems
academic to argue that it lessens the demand for diligence on the part
of the attorney for the appellant. It is submitted, however, that the
principal case is significant in that it better defines and perhaps extends
the means by which the Court will reverse capital cases. It is a liberal
and wise affirmance of our policy of jealously guarding the rights of
persons convicted of capital felonies.
DAMEL L. BELL, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Divorce-Domicile of Mihtary Personnel
Military personnel often face a perplexing problem in acquiring a
divorce, because of the prerequisites which are peculiar to such a pro-
ceeding. Every state requires a statutory period of "residence" within
its borders before a petition for divorce can be filed in its courts.1 The
word "residence," as used in these statutes, is interpreted as meaning
"domicile," 2 for "under our system of law, judicial power to grant a
"' State v. White, 232 N. C. 385, 61 S. E. 2d 84 (1950). It seems wise to set
out the whole charge where error as to any part is alleged since the court will
construe the charge as a whole to determine if there is prejudicial error. Swinton
v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N. C. 723, 727, 73 S. E. 2d 785, 788 (1953). But .e
Upchurch v. Robertson, 127 N. C. 127, 129, 37 S. E. 157, 159 (1900).
2 The court can "judicially know only what properly appears on the record."
State v. Ravensford Lumber Co., 207 N. C. 47, 48, 175 S. E. 713, 714 (1934).
'See N. C. GEr. STAT. §50-5 (1943 Recomp. 1950), ("In any action for abso-
lute divorce upon any of the grounds set forth in this section, allegations and proof
that the plaintiff or defendant has resided in North Carolina for at least six
months next preceding the filing of the complaint shall constitute compliance with
the residence requirements for prosecuting any such action for divorce.") See also
N. C. GEN. STAT. §50-6 (1043 Recomp. 1950), which provides for a residence of
six months in North Carolina as a prerequisite for petitioning for a divorce on the
basis of two years' separation.
2Caheen v. Caheen, 233 Ala. 494, 496, 172 So. 618 (1937); Ungermach v.
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divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile ...
The domicile of one spouse within a state gives power to that state...
to dissolve a marriage wheresoever.contracted. '
It is well, therefore, to briefly note the distinction between residence
and domicile. Residence means living in a certain locality. A domicile
requires a living in a locality with the intent to make such a place home.4
Thus intention is a most important factor in any determination of
domicile. There must be a concurrence of the act of residence and the
intent that the place shall become home.5 A person may have one or
more residences, but on the other hand, a person can have but one
domicile. It is evident, therefore, that a domicile is not lost until a
new one is acquired, for everyone must at all times have a domicile
somewhere.6 If residence is colorable, it is insufficient to give local
courts jurisdiction to entertain a bill for divorce. 7
Another settled rule as to domicile is particularly pertinent to mili-
tary personnel.8 That rule is that "a person cannot acquire a domicile
of choice by any act done under legal or physical compusion."'  Domi-
cile, therefore, requires a freedom of will-an exercise of volition or
freedom of choice not prescribed or dictated by any external necessity.' 0
Since military personnel are ordered to their stations, it is ordinarily
impossible for them to acquire a domicile in the jurisdiction where their
post is located." This is well illustrated in the leading case of Harris
Ungermach, 61 Cal. 2d 29, 142 P. 2d 99 (1943) ; Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill.
158, 39 N. E. 595 (1895); Johnson v. Johnson, 381 Ill. 362, 45 N. E. 2d 625
(1942) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N. C. 287, 45 S. E. 2d 572 (1947) ; Smith v. Smith,
194 Miss. 431, 12 So. 2d 428 (1943) ; Root v. Root, 57 R. I. 436, 190 Atl. 450
(1937); Connolly v. Connolly, 33 S. D. 346, 146 N. W. 581 (1914). In some
instances actual residence may be an added requirement. See article, infra.3 Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 228 (1945).
' Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P. 2d 293 (1943). RESTATE-
MENT CONFLICt OF LAWS § 9 (1934) gives the following definition: "Domicile is
the place with which a person has a settled connection for certain legal purposes,
either because his home is there or because that place is assigned to him by the
law."
'Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N. C. 287, 45 S. E. 2d 572 (1947).
Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N. C. 412, 99 S. E. 240 (1919) ; Hannon
v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115 (1883). In the latter case plaintiff, domiciled in North
Carolina, took a position in Washington, D. C., returning to his home in North
Carolina whenever possible. Held, for purposes of satisfying the qualifications
required of electors and persons holding office, that plaintiff is domiciled in North
Carolina.
Albee v. Albee, 141 Ill. 550, 31 N. E. 153 (1892).
' Stevens v. Allen, 139 La. 658. 71 So. 936 (1916) ; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 162
Pa. Super. 22, 56 A. 2d 362 (1948).
' RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS §21 (1934). This section is quoted in
cases too numerous to cite.
'0 Nobuo Hiramatsu v. Phillips, 50 F. Supp. 167 (S. D. Calif. 1943). (Di-
versity of citizenship was in question. The plaintiff was a Japanese-American
evacuee.)
1 1 RESTATEmENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS, § 21, comment c (1934). "A soldier
or sailor, if he is ordered to a station to which he must go and live in quarters
assigned to him, cannot acquire a domicile there though he lives in the assigned
quarters with his family; for he must obey orders and cannot choose to go else-
where.
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v. Harris.12 In that case the plaintiff lived in Iowa until he was ap-
pointed to the United States Military Academy. After graduation,
he returned to Iowa. Since that time, on orders from the government,
he lived at various camps and stations including the Philippine Islands
and the Panama Canal Zone as an officer in the United States Army.
While stationed in Massachusetts, he petitioned for divorce. It was
held that the plaintiff was still domiciled in Iowa.'3 It is apparently
settled that if an officer or enlisted man occupies quarters assigned to,
or provided for him on the military post he cannot acquire a domicile
there, even though he has expressed the affirmative intent of always
regarding that post or fort as his home.14 This is true even though his
family may be living with him.'3 Thus it is apparent that a serviceman,
in petitioning for a divorce, must, in the usual case, do so in the state
where he was inducted, for that state will ordinarily be his domicile.
The factors of time, distance, financial expense and necessary witnesses
may combine to defeat his attempts to successfully acquire a divorce.
If the state of his domicile has the unique statutory requirement of both
domicile and bona fide residence for a certain length of time preceding
the petitioning, it may be impossible for him to acquire a divorce while
he is in the service. 16
"Illustrations:
2. A's domicil is X. As an officer in the army, A is required to live in that
part of Y devoted to the purposes of an army post, his family being permitted
to reside and residing there with him. A is still domiciled in X."
"2205 Ia. 108, 215 N. W. 661 (1927), noted in 13 IA. L. REV. 347 (1928);
26 MIcH. L. Rv. 571 (1928).
"Id. The plaintiff petitioned for divorce in Iowa under a code provision of
Iowa giving jurisdiction in divorce to the district court of the county in which
"either party resides." In this case the plaintiff petitioned in the proper jurisdic-
tion, but in the usual instance the plaintiff attempts to acquire a divorce in thejurisdiction where he is stationed. Mohr v. Mohr, 206 Ark. 1094, 178 S. W. 2d
502 (1944) ; Stevens v. Allen, 139 La. 658, 71 So. 936 (19.16) ; Smith v. Smith,
194 Miss. 431, 12 So. 2d 428 (1943).
Squire v. Vaquez, 52 Ga. App. 790, 184 S. E. 629 (1936) involved an action
for distribution of the estate of the deceased who died in V.A. hospital in Au-
gusta, Ga. Parents of deceased were domiciled in Puerto Rico. He enlisted in
the army in 1918, and it was not shown that he changed his domicile after enlist-
ment. Held, deceased was domiciled in Puerto Rico." A persons' domicile is not
changed merely by his enlistment in the army, and his transfer or assignment by
military order to another jurisdiction."
In Dicks v. Dicks, 177 Ga. 379. 170 S. E. 245 (1933), the court placed some
emphasis on the fact that the federal government has power to exercise exclusive
legislation over military reservations purchased by the United States, and that
military personnel cannot acquire a domicil thereon unless permitted so to do by
the United States. Other courts place no emphasis on this point.
14 Dicks v. Dicks, 177 Ga. 370. 170 S. E. 245 (1933) ; Pendleton v. Pendleton.
109 Kan. 600, 201 Pac. 62 (1921); Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 Atl. 729(1926); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P. 2d 293 (1945). Cf.
Beasley v. Beasley, 93 N. H. 447, 43 A. 2d 154 (1945). This would not apply
to retired military personnel who are permitted to live on a military reservation,
for they are not under compulsion.
" RSTATEmENT. CoNrcicT oF LAws § 21 comment c (1934).
"EVA. CODE § 20-97 (1950), Hiles v. Hiles, 164 Va. 131, 178 S. E. 913 (1935).
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This does not mean that a serviceman may never be able to acquire
a domicile in the jurisdiction where he is on duty. Where, therefore,
the serviceman is allowed to live with his family off the post, some
courts have held that he may acquire a domicile there providing-and
the proviso is a big one-that he can prove both the act and intent
to acquire a home there.' 7 Thus in an Idaho case an enlisted man, who
was married in Virginia, was transferred to Idaho. He was granted
permission to live in Boise while he was stationed nearby. He rented
a room in Boise and expressed an intention to make Boise his home,
and to return there upon release from the service. The Idaho court
held that, under the facts of the case, the plaintiff had established by
sufficient independent evidence that he had acquired a domicile in
Idaho.' s A court will be hesitant to believe evidence of this nature,
therefore it is established that the intention to acquire a new domicile,
by military personnel, must be shown by the clearest and most un-
equivocal proof.19
Some states have given statutory relief to the serviceman's problem.
Kansas, for example, has passed a statute which reads:
A plaintiff in an action for divorce must have been an actual
resident in good faith of the state for one year next preced-
ing the filing of the petition, and a resident of the county in
which the action is brought at the time the petition is filed,
unless the action is brought in the county where the defendant
resides or may be summoned. Provided, that any person who
has been a resident on any United States Army Post or military
reservation within the State of Kansas for one year next pre-
ceding the filing of the petition may bring an action for divorce
(Both elements of domicile and bona fide residence are required for the period of
time. "To have been an actual bona fide resident within purview of this statute,
means to have been in this state for the required period with a permanent abode.")
See also Mo. R~v. STAT. § 1517 (1950), Hays v. Hays, 221 Mo. App. 516, 282
S. W. 57 (1926).
" Percy v. Percy, 188 Cal. 768, 207 Pac. 369 (1922); Hawkins v. Winstead,
65 Idaho 12, 138 P. 2d 972 (1943) ; St. John v. St. John, 291 Ky. 363, 163 S. W.
2d 820 (1942) ; Burgan v. Burgan, 207 La. 1057, 22 So. 2d 649 (1945) ; Struble
v. Struble, 177 S. W. 2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);'Kankelborg v. Kankelborg,
199 Wash..259, 90 P. 2d 1018 (1939); RETSTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAws, § 21,
comment c (1934) : "If, however, he is allowed to live with his family where he
pleases provided it is near enough to his post to enable him to perform his duty,
he can acquire a domicil where he lives.
"Illustrations:
3. A's domicil is X. A is an Army officer stationed at Y. He is permitted
to live outside the Army post. A marries a resident of Y, purchases a house in
Y and lives there with his family with the intention of making it his home. A
acquires a domicil of choice in Y!'
Hawkins v. Winstead, 65 Idaho 12, 138 P. 2d 972 (1943).
Kensil v. Pickens, 25 F. Supp. 455 (W. D. Tex. 1938); Ex parte White,
228 Fed. 88 (D. N. H. 1915).
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in any county adjacent to said United States Army Post or
Military reservation.20
North Carolina has a substantial military population. Whether our
legislature, like Kansas, would like to liberalize the usual rule of domi-
cile as to that population, requires considerations both political and
sociological in nature. At any rate, the serviceman's problem illustrates
but one of the strange results of the present divorce laws, having
domicile as a requirement. 21
H. WILLIAMv AsHLAw
Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Authority to
Individuals*
In Wilcher v. Sharpe' the North Carolina Supreme Court was called
upon to decide the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting the
erection of gins or mills "within the corporate limits of the town
without the consent of all property owners in three hundred feet of the
proposed site of building." The court held the ordinance invalid stating
that where the effectiveness of an ordinance determining the use of
property for a lawful purpose is conditioned upon the assent of private
persons, such as owners of adjacent property, it is an unconstitutional
grant of legislative power to private individuals.
This decision is in agreement with the often quoted rule that the
power conferred by the constitution upon the legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated by that body to individuals.2
In one of the earliest North Carolina cases considering this question,
Shaw v. Kennedy,3 where the town constable was given discretionary
power to "take up and sell all hogs running at large on the city street,"
2 KAe. GEN. STAT. § 60-1502 (1949). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §21966
(1943) ; GA. CODE § 30-107 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1272 (1951).2 See Baer, The Aftermath of Williams vs. State of North Carolina, 28 N. C
L. REv. 265 (1950).
* The author is here primarily concerned with the status of the lav as to the
delegation of legislative authority to individuals in North Carolina. Reference
to official groups is made only where it appears as a link in the chain of the de-
velopment of this law by the court. Reference should be made, in conjunction with
this article, to Note, 7 NCL REv. 315 (1929) where the delegation of legislative
authority resulting from zoning ordinances is discussed.
1236 N. C. 308, 72 S. E. 2d 662 (1952); accord, Eubank v. Richmond, 226
U. S. 137 (1912) ; State of Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
278 U. S. 116 (1928) ; Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S. C. 266, 20 S. E. 2d
699 (1942). Contra: Whitaker v. Green River Coal Co., 276 Ky. 43, 122 S. W.
2d 1012, 1016 (1938); State ex rel Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 129 Ohio St. 251,
194 N. E. 875 (1935); City of Spokane v. Camp, 50 Wash. 554, 97 P. 770 (1908).2 N. C. CoNsT. Art. I § 8, Art. II §1; Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N. C. 391,
8 S. E. 2d 252 (1940). See I CoOLEv's CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS, 434 (1927);
11 Amr. JuR., Legislatures to Individu als, 221; 70 ALR 1064.
24 N. C. 591 (1817) ; accord, People ex rel Bernat v. Bicek, 405 IIl. 510, 91
N. E. 2d 588 (1950); McCown v. Gose, 244 Ky. 402, 51 S. W. 2d 251 (1932).
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